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Journeys to the Limits of First-hand Knowledge: Politicians’ On-site Visits 
in Zones of Conflict and Intervention 
 
Berit Bliesemann de Guevara 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores the practice and political significance of politicians’ journeys to 
conflict zones. It focuses on the German example looking at field trips to theatres of 
international intervention as a way of first-hand knowing in policymaking. Paying 
tribute to Lisa Smirl and her thought-provoking work on humanitarian spaces, objects 
and imaginaries and on liminality in aid worker biographies, two connected 
arguments are developed. First, through the exploration of the routinised practices of 
politicians’ field trips I show how these journeys not only remain confined to the 
‘auxiliary space’ of aid/intervention, but that it is furthermore a staged reality of this 
auxiliary space that most politicians experience on their journeys. Based on this, I 
then ask, second, what politicians actually do experience on their journeys and how 
their experiences relate to their policy knowledge about conflict and intervention. I 
show that political field trips enable sensory/affectual, liminoid and liminal 
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experiences, which have functions such as authority accumulation, agenda setting, 
community building, and civilisation in domestic politics, while at the same time 
reinforcing, in most cases, pre-existing conflict and intervention imaginaries.  
 
Keywords: field trips, on-site visits, battlefield tourism, sensory experience, affect, 
conflict knowledge, first-hand knowledge, intervention, spaces of aid, liminality, 
German Bundestag, parliamentarians, German foreign policy, Lisa Smirl 
 
Introduction 
 
This article explores German politicians’ journeys to conflict zones that have or may become 
theatres of international (diplomatic, military, aid) intervention with German contribution. 
More specifically, it looks at the ways the spaces, built environments, objects and personnel 
that structure and populate these zones of intervention influence or interact with the 
experiences and insights that such journeys provide the travellers with, and which ultimately 
feed into parliamentarians’ policy knowledge on conflicts and interventions. Paying tribute to 
Lisa Smirl and her thought-provoking work on humanitarian spaces, objects and imaginaries 
(Smirl 2011a, 2011b, 2015) and on liminality in aid worker biographies (Smirl 2012), the 
article traces German members of parliament (MPs) on their journeys through the material 
and sensory/affectual landscapes of these ‘spaces of aid’ (Smirl 2015). 
The German parliament, the Bundestag, has traditionally shown high levels of travel 
activity. With the active German participation in multilateral peace- and statebuilding 
interventions since the mid-1990s, this has increasingly included troop and field visits to 
zones of conflict and intervention. While the new German military engagement did not have 
a significant effect on the frequency or amount of travel activity, it did change to some extent 
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the travels destinations and purposes, with theatres of German military deployment and 
questions of security and peacebuilding nature now becoming more important. The main 
rationale given for political travels to zones of conflict and intervention is shared across all 
parties represented in the Bundestag: on-site visits, so the common narrative, allow MPs to 
‘form their own picture of the situation on the ground’, and to get an ‘authentic’ or 
‘unvarnished’ insight into (intervention) reality (Buchholz and van Aken 2010, 1; Gädechens 
2012; Künast, Trittin and Nachtwei 2007; Lamers 2010). ‘[F]or such a mission cannot be 
decided based on paperwork alone’, as an MP of the conservative CSU stated with regard to a 
troop visit to Afghanistan (Hahn 2011). 
What shines through, despite the obvious rhetoric character of these statements, is a 
certain longing for ‘authenticity’ or ‘reality’ and for ‘first-order knowledge’ and ‘truth’ 
among the MPs. This is perhaps surprising in view of the triumph that evidence-based 
policymaking (EBP) has started in international development aid and peacebuilding circles. 
According to the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), one of the concept’s main early 
advocates, the ‘pursuit of EBP is based on the premise that policy decisions should be better 
informed by available evidence and should include rational analysis. This is because policy 
which is based on systematic evidence is seen to produce better outcomes’ (Sutcliffe and 
Court 2005, iii). While German NGO and aid agency circles have as yet not adopted 
evidence-based policymaking to the same extent as their UK and US counterparts, they too 
aspire to scientifically grounded demands and programmes.1 In a way this stands in odd 
contrast to the value that MPs attach to their occasional three- to five-day fleeting visits to 
Afghanistan, Kosovo or the DR Congo in order to ‘see for themselves’ – and yet, travel 
activity is burgeoning among MPs in Berlin. 
A second trend that has been diagnosed with regard to conflict- and intervention-
related policy-knowledge is a growing retreat from ‘the field’ and from case-specific, on-the-
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ground knowledge. Conflict and development researchers have criticised the growing 
remoteness of researchers and practitioners’ engagement with ‘the field’ due to increasing 
security thresholds and insurance/liability concerns, meaning that the ‘evidence’ produced for 
EBP only poorly reflects on-the-ground dynamics and logics (Andersson and Weigand 2015; 
Duffield 2010, 2014; Fisher Forthcoming; Sandstrom 2012). At first sight, German MPs’ 
travel activities appear like a counter-trend to this retreat from the field, since these trips are 
specifically targeted at ‘the situation on the ground’ in zones of conflict and intervention. Yet, 
since these journeys tend to be limited to the auxiliary spaces and compounds of aid and are 
only allowed to take place under conditions of relative security, they usually have very 
limited material effects on the western intervention imaginary in the sense of ‘fact-based 
evidence’ or ‘ground truth’. If at all influential, political travels rather tend to unfold their 
potential through the security-related affects they evoke in sensory experiences provided by 
the field trips, but whose causal connections with policymaking are anything but 
straightforward. 
The article proceeds in two steps and through the development of two closely related 
arguments. In the first section, I start by giving a brief overview of German MPs’ travel 
activity. I then show, through an exploration of their routinised practice, how these journeys 
not only remain confined to what Smirl has termed the ‘auxiliary space’ of aid/intervention, 
which is created by the built environment, objects and everyday life rituals of interveners and 
characterised by its insurmountable separation from the alleged beneficiaries of international 
involvement. What most politicians experience on their journeys is furthermore a staged 
reality of this auxiliary space, since programme points tend to be enactments of intervention 
routines by the different actors involved, serving purposes and following logics that are quite 
different from the quest for ‘authenticity’ and ‘truth’. Obviously, such staged experiences of 
intervention have even less to do with the lives of ‘local’ aid beneficiaries than the practices 
5	
	
and imaginaries of the international civil servants, aid workers, soldiers and other 
practitioners implementing peacebuilding interventions ‘on the ground’. While the latter will 
inevitably have some contact with ‘the local’ through interactions with local partners, 
employees and during project work, travelling politicians’ exposure to ‘the situation on the 
ground’ is temporally and spatially limited to such an extent that it cannot be but highly 
superficial. 
Therefore, rather than showing what politicians do not see/experience during their 
journeys, in the second part of the article I ask what it is that they do experience and how 
their experiences relate to policy knowledge about conflict and intervention. To answer this 
question, I draw on Smirl’s adoption of the works of Arnold van Gennep and Victor Turner 
to analyse aid work as a rite of passage, where the actual presence ‘in the field’ can be seen as 
an unstructured, betwixt-and-between stage in aid workers’ biographies characterised by 
liminality. I argue that, in a similar albeit less pronounced way, politicians’ field trips can 
provide the travellers with sensory, liminoid (quasi-liminal) and liminal experiences, which 
fulfil a number of functions such as investing MPs with ‘country/issue expertise’, bringing 
problems and topics ‘to life’ and to the attention of politicians, creating ties of friendship 
among MPs across party boundaries, and civilising the political process in Berlin. As the 
empirical examples will show, these functions are based to a much greater extent on the 
sensory/affectual landscapes of spaces of aid and intervention than they are on the rational 
ways of knowing that dominate politicians’ travel justifications. Except for one case, a 
Bosnia journey of the Green Party in 1996, in which a field visit was part of a major 
transition in party politics, field trips tend to bolster MPs’ outlook on the world and reinforce 
the general ‘humanitarian imaginary’ of German intervention politics rather than questioning 
it. I conclude with some thoughts on what my two propositions mean for the current debate 
on conflict- and intervention-related policy knowledge and the study of intervention politics. 
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The insights and examples used in this article are taken from a number of sources 
collected over the last years. These include dozens of travel reports, press releases and travel 
programmes sourced from MPs’ websites and through archival work in the German Green 
Party’s archive (Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis) in Berlin in December 2014. I also conducted a 
number of formal and informal interviews with officers and lower ranks of the German armed 
forces (Bundeswehr) in 2011-12 in order to learn more about the other, organising side of 
official troop and field visits. I complemented this information with impressions from my 
own participation in an academic 10-day journey to international military camps under 
German command in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Rajlovac) and Kosovo (Prizren) in June 2004. 
The programme of this journey showed many of the characteristics of politicians’ visits to 
these countries, since it was composed of modules prepared for official visitors, including 
briefings by the German embassy/representation, the German commander and other high-
ranking officers, on-site visits at German reconstruction and aid projects, and talks with 
carefully selected local agencies and groups as well as with international organisations’ 
representatives. 
Finally, during fieldwork in Berlin in June 2015, I conducted in-depths interviews 
with four MPs and one parliamentary assistant who is responsible for planning the field trips 
of a party faction in the Bundestag. In order to explore the limits of first-hand knowing 
through politicians’ field trips, I chose to talk with MPs commonly acknowledged to be 
among the most knowledgeable and/or committed in the area of German foreign and security 
politics and who have travelled to conflict zones with specific guiding, policy-related 
questions in mind, rather than for obvious (self-) representational purposes. Two of my 
interview partners principally supported German involvement in humanitarian and 
peacebuilding interventions, including military means, but had a critical stance on the ways 
this has been put into practice by German politics and governmental agencies; the other two 
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MPs objected to German military involvement on principle.2 Methodologically speaking, 
these MPs are the least likely cases of superficial engagement with intervention contexts and 
are therefore the most convincing cases to explore the limits of first-hand knowing through 
on-site visits. 
 
 
Journeys to ‘the field’: fleeting visits to the auxiliary space of intervention 
 
The phenomenon of MPs’ field trips in German foreign and security politics 
 
Despite the physical exertions attached to on-site visits in intervention theatres, the number of 
official trips by German MPs is high. For one, this suits the habitus and self-conception of 
German parliamentarians, among whom travelling has not only been a customary activity, but 
has indeed come to be seen as a kind of duty – as explained in the regular Bundestag reports 
on foreign travel activities and spending:  
 
In order to satisfy [Germany’s] international responsibility, it is vital that the members 
of the German Bundestag cultivate an intensive cooperation with foreign politicians 
and institutions. This way the MPs can collect on the ground the information and 
experiences necessary for their tasks and react to the international state of affairs and 
emerging conflict situations in an appropriate way (Deutscher Bundestag 2013, 2, 
italics added). 
 
Accordingly, for the years 1991-2009, the Bundestag archive recorded between 202 
(1998) and 826 (2008) parliament-financed official travels to foreign countries per year, 
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amounting to annual costs of between €1.6 million and €3.6 million respectively (Feldkamp 
2011, 1611-14). Not included in these figures, since not accountable to the parliament, are the 
numerous individual and group journeys financed by the different parties/parliamentary 
factions without Bundestag involvement.3 While only a fraction of the travels under the 
umbrella of the Bundestag are directed at (post-) conflict countries – a rough estimate based 
on Bundestag archive figures suggests that the share is around 10 per cent on average –, there 
is a steady stream of visitors travelling to the theatres of current, or possible future, military 
and civilian interventions.4 
There are several types of politicians’ on-site visits and field trips, which differ 
regarding their degree of travel programme flexibility.5 The most rigid type is official visits 
by ministers or secretaries of state, to which the members of parliamentary committees – 
usually one representative per party – are invited (Obleute-Reisen). My interviewees agreed 
that in order to find answers to one’s questions about an intervention or an armed conflict 
these are the least productive journeys, since the programme is determined by the ministerial 
agenda and has mainly representational functions, as also the accompanying journalists 
suggest. Journeys organised by parliamentary committees (Ausschussreisen), such as the 
defence or human rights committees, offer MPs greater possibilities to influence the 
programme. The least other-directed journeys, however, are those organised by the 
parliamentary factions (Fraktionsreisen) or single MPs (Individualreisen), often financed by 
the parties themselves, since these trips allow them to tailor the visit to their specific 
questions and interests.  
In addition to these differences in travel types, the motivation of individual MPs for 
on-site visits also differs considerably, ranging from symbolical politics directed at domestic 
voter constituencies, to personal interests in an organised or calculated ‘adventure’, to 
genuine fact-finding motives. In analogy to categories of modern mass tourism, the first two 
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types of MPs are usually to be found on ‘package tours’, while the ‘fact-finders’ show typical 
characteristics of the ‘independent traveller’, who strives to explore the destination off the 
beaten track as far as practically possible. What the ‘package’ and ‘individual’ types of 
journeys differ in most is the extent to which MPs are able to penetrate the layers of multiple 
social-theatrical performances that such visits necessarily entail, as I have discussed in more 
detail elsewhere (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; Forthcoming). All my interviewees figured 
in the ‘independent traveller’ category, even though sometimes participating in the 
unavoidable ‘package tours’. Both the ‘package’ and the ‘independent’ types of political field 
trips, however, remain basically confined to the ‘auxiliary space’ of the intervention – with 
important effects on MPs’ intervention imaginary. 
 
 
Adventures of the ‘battlefield tourist’ in the auxiliary space of intervention 
 
The typical parliamentarians’ journey to places where the German Bundeswehr is/has been 
part of a military intervention – that is, the typical journey of what German soldiers tongue-
in-cheek call ‘battlefield tourists’ (Baumann et al. 2011, 97) – is exclusively limited to, and 
mediated by, the ‘auxiliary space’ of intervention with its built environment, objects and 
rituals as described and analysed by Smirl (2015). She uses the term ‘auxiliary space’ to 
describe ‘the physical, material and spatial environments resulting from the everyday 
practices of the international community when performing an international intervention’ 
(Smirl 2015, 203) – for instance, the compounds where military and civilian interveners live 
and the secluded grand hotels where ‘the international community’ meets, the objects 
interveners use on a day-to-day basis, such as the typical white SUVs (Smirl 2011a), and 
even the war-zone souvenir (see Kühn in this special section). The auxiliary space is also 
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what ties ‘expats’ together while separating them from the supposed beneficiaries of the 
intervention: ‘Even when [aid workers in the field] are not explicitly a spatially constrained 
group, boundaries are formed which create and maintain divisions between various groups’ 
(Smirl 2015, 90).  
In Smirl’s tripartite model of space in interventions, the auxiliary space is one element 
next to, second, the humanitarian imaginary – the ‘abstract, conceptual yet programmatic way 
the international community thinks about the so-called problem of underdevelopment’ (ibid, 
203) – and third, the tactics of the beneficiaries of aid who experience and adapt international 
projects in their own way in the ‘lived project space’ (ibid, 204). Auxiliary space and 
humanitarian imaginary are closely intertwined and mutually constitutive; that is, where 
interveners live, how they travel, etc. influences what they think about conflict, development 
and intervention politics. The same can be said for MPs field visits to zones of conflict and 
intervention. When arriving in the capital of a country, MPs usually reside in the best hotel in 
town, the ‘grand hotels’ so aptly described and sharply analysed by Smirl (2011b; cf. also 
Follath 2005). As one MP reflected: ‘This is the usual “international island”, with very few 
differences between the different countries. That is to say, being there you have not really 
arrived in the country yet.’6 The likelihood that MPs on ‘package tours’ remain in this kind of 
‘gilded cage’7 is high.  
Andersson and Weigand (2015, 5-8) have graphically described what ‘life in the 
“Kabubble”’, the international space that separates the members of the ‘expat community’ 
from Afghans’ life in Kabul, looks like, and this is mainly the perspective that MPs take 
when visiting Afghanistan (or other places), since security requirements – dictated by the 
obligatory accompanying police forces of the German Federal Criminal Police Office – 
prohibit most movement or interaction outside of this very confined space. There are, of 
course, major differences between how MPs on a visit experience the auxiliary space of 
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intervention and how humanitarian aid workers and peacebuilders experience and inhabit it. 
While intervention agencies have been criticised for the high turnover of international staff 
(Smirl 2015, chap. 3), the temporalities of work in zones of conflict and intervention, even if 
limited to deployments of only a few months, still differ considerably from politicians’ 
fleeting visits of a few days. Other major differences concern the practices and subjectivities 
that characterise the two groups. Intervention practitioners’ work consists in project 
formulation, implementation and management, programme evaluation and reporting, and 
competition over information, funds and responsibilities on the ground (Veit and Schlichte 
2012; Autesserre 2014). Most travelling politicians see their task in political representation 
and perhaps the collation of information; they are briefed by practitioners on the ground and 
visit projects, but they are not involved in any of the intervention tasks themselves. They also 
clearly see themselves as representatives of domestic politics and electorates, contrasting with 
the often cosmopolitan self-understanding of the staff of international intervention agencies. 
On all accounts, travelling politicians are only visitors, who are hosted, guided and mediated 
by – and thus dependent upon – the practitioners on the ground. 
The typical MP visit is facilitated by German embassy personnel, who – in 
consultation with the MPs and ministries back home – organise meetings and on-site visits, 
and carried out in large parts by the Bundeswehr, who are in charge of transport and whose 
camps also constitute a typical programme point on the MPs’ visit schedule. This is not 
surprising as such, given that MPs’ journeys are usually focussed on ‘Germany in 
Afghanistan’ (Daxner 2014), that is, on the performance of German contributions to the 
intervention and the wellbeing of German military and civilian personnel. In addition to these 
practical and political reasons why Bundeswehr camps in North Afghanistan are at the top of 
the programme list, troop visits are also cherished by the average travelling MP due to the 
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perception that, ‘the Bundeswehr has the most attractive programme points – those which 
make great photos, which are interesting to journalists, especially the military vehicles’.8 
There are some notable exceptions to the rule of routinised field trips, when MPs 
manage to travel to places classified as too dangerous or to talk to people who German state 
agencies would rather not have them talk to. For instance, in early 2010 two MPs of the Left 
Party and one Green Party MP travelled to Afghanistan together to find out about the view of 
Afghans, who were victims or bereaved of the infamous German ‘Kunduz bombing’ of 2009, 
an airstrike on two petrol tanks near Kunduz allegedly stolen by members of the Taliban, 
which killed a high number of civilians (Buchholz and van Aken 2010; Ströbele, 2009). 
Another delegation of four Left Party representatives went on a fact-finding mission to Sudan 
in 2011 to explore what effects military means would have on the different conflicts in Sudan 
and post-independence South Sudan (van Aken et al. 2011). These journeys where organised 
as fact-finding missions and aimed at the collection of information independent from, or 
critical of, official German government sources. While German state agencies were again 
involved in the logistics of these travels, which also involved elements of the routine 
itinerary, the MPs also managed to organise their own agenda items. Overall, however, such 
attempts to break out of the journey routines are far and few between. 
From the perspective of ‘the visited’, parliamentarians’ field trips are just another 
obligatory task on their daily to-do list, and most intervention agencies develop routines of 
how to deal with official visitors. The Bundeswehr, for instance, prepares programme 
modules, which usually revolve around the respective focus of the mission and can be reeled 
off instantly. To give an example, in the case of the Afghanistan mission in 2009 one such 
focus concerned the Afghan police officer training in Mazar-e-Sharif, a task first 
implemented by the Bundeswehr and later taken over by international police forces. Visits to 
the police training centre were part of the standard visit programme at the time. ‘The 
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politicians were to see that’, a Bundeswehr soldier9 recalled, ‘but we felt uncomfortable. We 
were pulled out of our routine, and then everything was like a show of force. That was mere 
exhibition, meant to show: “This and that is what we do”.’ The training centre was situated in 
the vicinity of the field camp. The visitors inspected the training of the Afghan police officers 
‘like visiting a school class.’ The various demonstrations included skills such as car searches 
and crime scene work. A soldier remembered: ‘All these were skills that were part of the 
training syllabus and would be taught at some stage, but up to that moment the Afghan 
policemen hadn’t learned them yet. Therefore everything was drilled a few days beforehand. 
– It was more a type of theatre performance.’ 
In view of the staged character of the auxiliary space that MPs witness on their 
journeys, I have suggested elsewhere to understand field and troop visits more generally as 
manifestations of social theatrical performance (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012; Forthcoming). 
These direct	 encounters between politically responsible persons of the sending state, the 
policy-implementing organisations on the ground and the so-called local partners in the 
intervened country are staged in many ways by these different actors. In this specific 
example, the performative character of troop visits on the part of the military grows out of the 
organisational necessity to routinise the visits and intra-organisational career logics. The 
Bundeswehr soldiers I interviewed judged the idea that troop visits could serve politicians to 
‘form an accurate picture of the situation’, if only of the confined space in which the military 
operated, as unrealistic. They related that visitors were usually offered a tight programme and 
were often ‘bombarded with information’; they had little time to contemplate or ask. 
Additionally, ‘sugar-coating’ was the order of the day: problems were usually not addressed, 
probably out of fear to ‘get squashed’ by a superior, that is, to risk a disciplinary warning or, 
in the worst case, the end of one’s career, if deficiencies in their area of responsibility came 
14	
	
to light. Correspondingly, the visitors had few possibilities to ‘talk with normal soldiers’. If a 
politician explicitly wished to converse with soldiers, these were usually carefully chosen.  
I would argue that the military’s enactment of ‘life in the camp’ is just another form 
of routinising and ritualising life in the ‘intervention bubble’ in general (for a polemical UN 
Head of Mission’s account of his perspective as ‘the visited’, see Koenigs 2014). The MPs I 
interviewed were aware of the highly staged character of their visits, agreeing that the 
standard visit does never leave this general level of enactment. They also shared the 
impression that there was not much to be learned about ‘the situation on the ground’ from 
such enacted encounters, or as one MP put it: ‘What is indeed right: one has experienced the 
sun, one has experienced the heat, in Kabul one has experienced the dirty air – that is, one has 
picked up on important micro-tesserae – but this is about all.’10 Nonetheless, all of them 
agreed that there were things to be learned or experienced on such travels, which were 
impossible to acquire in Berlin (cf. also Koenigs 2014). I will therefore now turn to the 
question what it is that travelling adds to the policymaking process. 
 
 
‘Travel broadens the mind’: the sensory and liminal experiences of field visits 
 
‘Travelling cultivates’ [Reisen bildet], since it ‘broadens the horizon’ or ‘the mind’, are oft-
used sayings in the German educated middle class, and they seem to inform to some extent 
what the more committed or critical politicians I interviewed expect to achieve, in addition to 
targeted fact-finding, through their field trips. Against the background of the limits to first-
hand experience posed by the confinedness of MPs’ field trips to the self-referential auxiliary 
spaces of aid and intervention, however, the inevitable question arises what it actually is that 
politicians ‘gain from’ or ‘cultivate’ through these journeys. 
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Based on an in-depth analysis of 26 travel reports and six press releases, I have argued 
elsewhere (Bliesemann de Guevara 2014) that ‘the field’, which politicians see/experience 
during their journeys, serves first and foremost as a canvas for domestic intervention 
imaginaries and narratives. Domestic intervention discourses, including cultural stereotypes, 
and MPs’ individual stances on (military) intervention are the filters through which places 
such as Afghanistan are looked at and experienced, resulting in a variety of different 
‘Afghanistan’ images depending on the lens the travelling MPs use to ‘assess the situation on 
the ground’. In other words, not German intervention policies are the independent variable in 
this equation, but ‘Afghanistan’ itself oscillates in the eye of the beholder. And while some 
politicians have indeed found indicators for the overall success of the international ‘support 
mission’ in Afghanistan (e.g., Hahn 2011), others have brought evidence for intervention 
failures to the table, for instance, by showing that the military intervention has undermined 
what could have been a successful case of development cooperation (e.g., Buchholz and van 
Aken 2010; Schäfer 2012). 
Zones of conflict and intervention, in their immense diversity in terms of localised 
conflict dynamics, lend themselves well to such self-referential and diverse interpretations, as 
the following quote from Green Party MP Winfried Nachtwei’s report on an Afghanistan 
journey in 2009 suggests: 
 
I experience highly diverse risk/security levels during these days: the ‘high-security 
wing’ around the presidential palace, embassies etc. in the centre of Kabul; the 
vestiges of destruction of the suicide attacks in front of the ISAF headquarters und the 
German embassy; the lively traffic chaos and the astonishing survival capacity of 
pedestrians, bicyclists and disabled people, who cross the traffic stream against every 
rule; the normality of the metropolis with little police and military presence in other 
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urban districts; the unusual freedom of movement in Mazar[-e-Sharif] and Feyza[bad] 
without major protections, even after dark; in the two northern provinces lots of 
waving at the roadside, including at Bundeswehr vehicles; then the reports from the 
guerrilla zone around Kunduz (Nachtwei 2009, 3). 
 
In view of this diversity of different localised conflict realities, it does not come as a 
surprise that MPs mainly find what they are looking for when forming their picture of the 
situation on the ground (in detail, Bliesemann de Guevara 2014). This self-referentiality is 
not surprising either, given that German MPs’ main task is to shape German (not Afghan) 
politics, and it is obviously underpinned by the auxiliary spaces that confine what travellers 
actually see/experience, as I have argued above. Nonetheless, while hinting at a possible 
deeper layer of experience gained through such journeys, my previous studies have stopped 
short of exploring whether the travel experiences translate into anything beyond the 
confirmation of already existing political positions on questions of (military) intervention. 
My re-reading of the collected research materials suggests two answers to this 
question, which I develop below. First, field visits bring politics and concepts ‘to life’ and ‘to 
the attention’ of MPs in a way that reports, experts, and even media images cannot achieve 
and which can only be traced back to the sensory experiences the parliamentarians are 
exposed to during their travels. So, while travels may not change in every case what 
specifically MPs think about a policy issue, they do put the issue on their personal agenda 
and create some sort of emotional bond with a country, topic and/or group of actors. Second, 
the extra-ordinary experience of a journey to a (post-) conflict zone removes politicians from 
the daily routine of their work and often also goes along with a certain kind of exceptionality 
in terms of weakening hierarchies and bridging ideological divides. In this sense, field trips 
show signs of liminal experiences, which reflect back on the individuals and/or the group 
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relationships among the travellers. As I will show, in one case the liminal experience of a 
journey even had transformative effects on travellers. In most cases, however, effects are 
rather partial and quasi-liminal (or liminoid) and ultimately contribute to the symbolical 
repertoire that serves to civilise domestic political conflict in German foreign and security 
politics. 
 
 
Bringing ‘problems’, ‘causes’ and ‘solutions’ to life: sensory experiences in policymaking 
 
When asked in my interviews what MPs can actually gain from travels to conflict zones, 
which they cannot gather from the media, ministerial briefings, think tanks reports, academic 
literatures or discussions with experts and practitioners from ‘the field’, all interviewees 
agreed that one effect of ‘being in the field’ was to bring things closer to them, as the 
following memory from an MP’s journey to the DR Congo illustrates: 
 
The graphicness, this powerfulness – for example in Kinshasa: landing in Kinshasa in 
the evening’s darkness, and then you drive from the airport to the city, and to your 
right and your left lies a sea of dwellings which are completely dark, and the people 
have these dim lights in front of the dwellings, since there is no electricity. And then 
on the road, to see cars which are really old heaps and are completely overladen. One 
realises how far off this is from our orderly conditions. Such impressions, for instance 
– of course, they are only impressions, but anyway – they grip you in a different way, 
they interest you in a different way.11 
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Some MPs also spoke about specific moments or events in ‘the field’ that helped them 
translate abstract concepts of the causes and nature of contemporary intra-state wars ‘into 
reality’, to visualise them. One parliamentarian recalled visiting the frontline in Mostar, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and being bewildered by the extent to which the houses were 
scarred – ‘Somebody had aimed for them over and over again’ – and how this was different 
from his childhood memories of post-WWII scenes of houses randomly hit by a single bomb. 
From another journey, during a visit to a hospital in the DR Congo, he remembered the 
overwhelming smell of putrefying human flesh emanating from the landmine injuries of a 
boy who had been admitted to the hospital only days after the landmine incident. ‘These 
moments visualised for me what “small wars” are’, he reflected.12 
Similarly, in his report on the Green Party chairpersons’ joint journey to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 1996 (see in detail the next article section), Jürgen Trittin describes the 
following scene: 
 
The atmosphere of Mostar is disconcerting. The surroundings of the famous 
demolished bridge contrast sharply in their picturesqueness with the shot-to-pieces 
houses at the frontline. This evening, on the hotel balcony, I look at the mountains, 
from which the Serbs fired into the city. At their foot newly renovated houses, 
electrically lighted. And directly in front of me, on the other side of the street by the 
river, completely destroyed buildings, with window cases and door bays like empty 
eye sockets, shelled by the Bosnian Croats. Almost terrified I step back from the 
balcony, when I realise that some two years ago I could not have stood on this 
illuminated balcony like this (Trittin 1996, 5). 
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Two observations are important here. First, it is clear that the MPs use concepts well 
known to them to make sense of what they see in a conflict/intervention zone. In this sense, 
again, the sensory experience of the journey is more of an ‘amplifier’ or perhaps a 
‘developer’ in the photographic sense, bringing to consciousness politicians’ preconceived 
intellectual knowledge about violent conflict and war. At the same time, just like ‘[s]ecurity 
is encountered as specific devices, techniques, objects and personnel that oscillate between 
absence and presence as they fold with everyday lives’ (Anderson 2015, 273), war and 
intervention are not related to ‘per se’, but only through specific encounters with spaces, 
objects and people. Second, what is also evident from these examples is that it is not only the 
visual – what MPs see – that captures their imagination, but actually a more comprehensive 
sensory experience of seeing, smelling, feeling, and hearing that vaults individuals into a state 
of second-hand reliving of an experience, a kind of ‘caught-up own experience’13 (on visual 
practice and affectivity, see e.g. MacDonald 2010; MacDonald et al. 2010).  
These observations bring this article into dialogue with the emergent literature on 
affect within critical geopolitics. Carter and McCormack (2010, 107-8) define affect ‘as a 
kind of turbulent background field of relational intensity, irreducible to and not containable 
by any single body or subject’. Feeling then is ‘understood as the registering of intensity in a 
sensing body before that intensity is recognised as a distinct emotion’, such as fear, pity or 
trust. A lot of what MPs describe in interviews and travel reports falls into the fuzzy sphere of 
affect or feelings, rather than distinct emotions, although emotions such as fear or 
mistrust/trust may well arise out of the second-hand reliving of a war experience or out of 
encounters with local leaders. In this sense, the experience of political field trips is perhaps 
more about ‘gut instincts’ than about clear-cut emotions.14 
This form of sensory experience – experiences which are not (yet) emotions but rather 
fuzzily sensed affects or feelings – and the embodied knowing related to it are not limited to 
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places, objects or concepts, but also include the situational relationship with discussion 
partners such as national politicians or civil society representatives on these visits. One MP 
recalled the differences between meetings with two ‘warlords’, one in the DR Congo, the 
other in Afghanistan. While the Congolese leader gave the impression of a ‘muscular power 
machine’, living in a ‘fantastically equipped residence’, but did not interact on a non-verbal 
level with the visiting MPs – ‘it was like talking to a mask’ –, the Afghan leader was 
described as ‘a young guy, very alert, feisty’, who gave the ‘impression something sparked 
there and you can talk to him – of course, he also had his agenda, but nonetheless – you felt 
you could somehow talk to each other’.15  
Such impressions and encounters, as patchy as they may be, are important elements of 
politics since they may influence the MPs’ voting behaviour in parliament or feed into 
discussions of who among the elite of the recipient country of intervention to work with and 
who to exclude in western attempts to build states and peace (Beswick 2011; critical: Hensell 
and Gerdes 2012). Non-cognitive or precognitive processes may raise/maintain MPs’ interest 
in a topic or their perspective on a national leader, but it also makes it harder for them to 
accept information or take decisions that run counter to their gut feeling – or as one MP put 
it, citing a word of advice referring to budgetary decisions he had received from an older 
colleague: ‘Ignorance protects from granting’, meaning that it is much harder to reject 
funding for a project once you have been on site, seen the project and met the people behind 
it.16 The causal relationship between affects and feelings, on the one hand, and the policy 
process, on the other, is not straightforward, however, because of the ‘indetermination of 
affect’ due to ‘the multiplicity of channels and forms of mediation’ of affectual life 
(Anderson 2015, 273). This means that rather than drawing general conclusions about the 
relationship between politicians’ journeys and their policymaking, research needs to look into 
specific situations and describe these relationships in their specific context. 
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‘Betwixt and between’: the political field trip as liminoid or liminal experience 
 
The other aspect, which the MPs’ descriptions of their sensory experiences during official 
journeys suggest, is that such field trips to conflict zones are in many ways characterised by 
liminality. That is, the MPs are to a certain extent taken out of the normal day-to-day rules, 
routines and ranks that characterise their work in Berlin or in their election district and 
catapulted into an environment where this normality is suspended, if only for a very brief 
time. We may therefore also interpret politicians’ field trips as liminoid or liminal 
experiences. 
Drawing on the work of Arnold van Gennep (1960) and its elaboration by Victor 
Turner (1967; 1974), Smirl has described aid work as a rite of passage, understood as ‘a 
tripartite process consisting of, first, separation from an initial or equilibrium state, followed 
by a liminal or marginal state, and concluding by a re-aggregation (or re-incorporation) with 
the original society’ (Smirl 2012, 231; cf. van Gennep 1960, chap. 1). In humanitarian work, 
Smirl argues, ‘the field’ constitutes the liminal or marginal space of this transition from the 
pre- to the postliminal state (Smirl 2012, 236-40; cf. also Heathershaw in this special 
section). Liminality is a stage marked by ‘ambiguity, a sort of social limbo which has few 
[…] of the attributes of either the preceding or subsequent profane social statuses and cultural 
states’ (Turner 1974, 57). It is a ‘world of contingency where events and ideas, and “reality” 
itself, can be carried in different directions’ (Thomassen 2009). The liminality implied in aid 
work, Smirl shows, is that of a temporal stage between ‘the before and after of living a 
“normal life” in the so-called First World’ (Smirl 2012, 241). The personal transition aid 
workers undergo in this process is inward-looking (e.g., personal maturing, changed social 
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status or relationships ‘at home’), and ‘being in the field’ – in the auxiliary spaces discussed 
above – has almost exclusively to do with the international ‘bubble’ and only very little with 
‘the local’ (ibid.). 
 While I am wary to the stretch the analogy too far due to the differences between 
visiting politicians and on-the-ground practitioners discussed above, I would still argue that 
there are elements of transition rites that allow thinking about politicians’ field trips as 
modern political rites of passage, too (cf. Horvath, Thomassen and Wydra 2015, on the 
transfer of the concept of liminality to different fields). Certainly, in traditional societies to 
undergo a rite of passage, such as an initiation rite in the passage from girl to woman or boy 
to man, is not an option but a social norm. In contrast, MPs’ field trips are in essence 
voluntary and in this sense have more in common with pilgrimages (Turner and Turner 1978) 
or with the liminoid experiences that Turner (1974) confines mostly to the realms of leisure 
and play (for a critique see Thomassen 2009; 2014). Nonetheless, there is a fair share of 
social expectation (from peers, the media, the public) underpinning the ‘travelling culture’ 
among German MPs, which makes political field trips quasi-obligatory in order to distinguish 
oneself as a country/issue expert. As one MP put it:  
 
The pressure to travel is relatively high, for if you talk about a country […] the 
question is practically inevitable and often slightly intimate: “So when was the last 
time that you’ve been to Azerbaijan?” As if to say: “Excuse me, do you also know a 
brothel from the inside?” It’s a bit of an awkward question because one fears that 
someone will say: “No, but I’ve read everything about Azerbaijan.”17 
 
In this sense, politicians’ field visits to zones of conflict and intervention could be 
understood as a rite of passage in a transition from a preliminal state of non-expertise to a 
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postliminal ‘expert’ status among domestic peers. Given the changing nature of political 
situations, however, a single journey is usually not seen as sufficient; MPs have to engage in 
occasional but repetitive on-site visits in order to maintain the expert status. 
There is a second element described by the literature on liminality that seems to apply 
to politicians’ field visits: the creation of strong friendship ties, or communitas, among those 
sharing the liminal state, despite their social differences in the pre- and post-liminal states 
(Turner 1967, 98-101; 1974, 76-83). The condition that enables close bonding during 
betwixt-and-between states of liminality is that a ‘characteristic of transitional beings is that 
they have nothing. They have no status, property, insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship 
position, nothing to demarcate them structurally from their fellows’ (Turner 1967, 98-9). This 
allows for comradeship to emerge (ibid, 101). In a similar vein, Smirl (2012) describes how 
aid workers’ liminal state in the field leads to ‘close-knit emotional bonds that are created 
between members of the international community’ (Smirl 2012, 241).  
Something similar can be described, although again only to a limited extent, for 
politicians’ journeys to zones of conflict and intervention. On the one hand, field trips seem 
to highlight the commonalities of ‘being human’, while toning down the social, ideological, 
status or other differences structuring the everyday political business in Berlin. One MP 
described, for instance, how members of a travel party would almost automatically start 
addressing each other with the familiar German ‘du’ [you] instead of the formal ‘Sie’, how 
they would eventually come to think about political opponents as essentially nice persons, 
and how learning about a colleague’s personal life trajectory would help understand why this 
person behaves in a certain way. Also the exertions of travelling as such seem to have a 
levelling effect on the participants, for instance, when collectively struggling against the sleep 
during the first on-site visit after a strenuous and sleepless night in an uncomfortable airplane 
seat.  
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Informal events and experiences during these journeys, such as a social evening 
involving drinks, can also contribute to bonding across party boundaries with the potential to 
create sustained relationships beyond the liminal period of the journey.18 As one MP 
formulated it: ‘There is something that emerges [on these joint journeys], an “other”; in this 
sublimation of the situation emerges something else, and this emerges outside the normal 
frame – out of the box, so to say.’19 Based on these observations, it may therefore be argued 
that the experience of travelling together has, to a certain extent, the potential of creating 
sustainable boundary-crossing relationships between MPs, which may not emerge in day-to-
day work routines. The same MP accordingly suggested to see parliamentarians’ group 
journeys across party boundaries as a contribution to the range of symbolical acts that 
‘subtilize political conflict in parliament in the direction of civilised forms’. Symbolical acts 
with similar functions include not least the official speech in parliament, which has gained 
considerably more academic attention from political scientists, however, than the practice of 
on-site visits. 
This may also explain, among other reasons and functions, why field trips are 
regularly drawn upon as a rhetorical device in parliamentary debates (see in more detail, 
Bliesemann de Guevara 2012). In a debate on 3 December 2009 about the question of an 
extension of the Bundeswehr mandate in Afghanistan, for example, MP Reiner Arnold of the 
social-democratic SPD made the following reference to a journey:  
 
[…] I only say: the two representatives that head your parliamentary group, those who 
deliver the loudest speeches on this topic, who reap the most superficial and cheap 
applause for this […], who do everything to monopolise the followers of the peace 
movement […], these two have never been to Afghanistan. It would be instructive, 
however, if Mr Lafontaine and Mr Gysi went to Afghanistan, talked to a range of 
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people there, asked around and learned from it. I adhere to this challenge. I’ve got the 
impression that this could at least change the tone of the debate in a sense. I think this 
is necessary (AG Friedensforschung 2009).20 
 
Earlier in the same speech Arnold had talked about the joint journey with 
parliamentarians from different parties and about the manifold impressions of ‘Afghanistan’ 
they had had on this journey. Challenging non-travelled MPs to join such journeys – ‘to 
change the tone of the debate in a sense’ – hints indeed at the potential ‘civilising’ function 
that joint travelling is perceived to have on domestic political conflict. 
The transition from non-expert to expert and the communitas-building effects of 
travelling together are liminoid rather than liminal, I would argue, since they resemble rather 
than reproduce the status transitions that genuine rites of passage, as described by van 
Gennep and Turner, usually involve. Indeed, it is usually not a political journeys’ outspoken 
aim to provide the traveller with a new status when re-aggregating with the ‘society’ of 
parliamentarians back home – the state change from non-expert to expert apart perhaps. 
There is one instance in German foreign and security politics since 1990, however, in which a 
journey to a zone of conflict and intervention can be interpreted as a more truly liminal stage 
in a transition from a preliminal state to a clearly different postliminal state – with far-
reaching and long-lasting results.  
This instance is the joint journey of the Green Party’s boards (that is, the speakers of 
the party and of its parliamentary group in the Bundestag) to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 
20-25 October 1996. The journey was the culmination and, at the same time, the turning point 
of an existential debate that had shaken the party for some time, namely over the question of 
pacifism. The Green Party had grown out of the peace and environmental movements of the 
1970s and 1980s and had traditionally promoted the principle of pacifism, summarised in the 
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dictum ‘No more war!’ and held dear by the Fundis, the left wing within the party. Yet, this 
principle had been increasingly questioned by the Realos, the right wing of the party, in view 
of mass human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the first half of the 
1990s. In a nutshell, the question that arose was whether military interventions represented a 
legitimate means to protect human rights (reduced to the formula ‘No more Auschwitz!’), and 
whether Germany should participate in such multilateral humanitarian interventions. For a 
party built on the principle of pacifism, this was an existential question and one which at the 
time threatened to break the party apart. The decision to jointly travel to a site of war and 
mass violations of human rights was in this sense an essential step, since what was at stake 
was nothing less than the party’s future.21  
The following is an excerpt from a published interview with MP Winfried Nachtwei, 
who participated in this journey and for whom the experience of the Bosnia journey was the 
clear turning point in the debate: 
  
Winfried Nachtwei: […] At some point, we were standing above Sarajevo and later I 
wrote in my journey diary: “From the slope above the street Serbian artillery, mortars, 
tanks fired as they pleased into the city. Sarajevo on the show, defenceless in the 
mousetrap – and that for three years! This is when it overwhelms me: pain, shame … 
Joschka [Fischer] gives Kerstin [Müller] the needle: For sure, customs officers would 
have helped here, with yardsticks…. Later he tells me that he had felt ashamed here 
that he had not been in favour of intervening earlier. This should never happen to him 
again.” In this moment I realised clearly in mind and heart what had happened here. 
Completely inevitably, I perceived the victims’ perspective. The others felt the same. 
Later we were received in audience by the Catholic bishop of Banja Luka, Franjo 
Komarica. He took us to task in a way that even the most obstinate politicians had 
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tears in their eyes. He reproached us: “What did you let happen to a part of Europe 
again.”  
[Interviewer]: And after this journey everything was different in the Green Party? 
Winfried Nachtwei: The personal reports and experiences continued to have an effect 
in the party and the parliamentary group and changed our position fundamentally. For 
me it meant: Something of a kind of Screbrenica and Sarajevo shall never happen 
again in the sphere of influence of European politics. Later this also formed an 
important background for the decision on Kosovo […]. (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 
2010, original italics). 
 
Referring to Turner, Thomassen (2009) has suggested that there are instances when 
the idea of liminality helps ‘understand the human reactions to liminal experiences: the way 
in which personality was shaped by liminality, the sudden foregrounding of agency, and the 
sometimes dramatic tying together of thought and experience.’ Based on the description 
above, one can justifiably argue that the Green Party speakers’ joint journey was such a 
dramatic moment, or as Nachtwei put it in a personal conversation: ‘That was our Damascus 
experience!’, referring to the dramatic biblical conversion of Apostle Paul (named Saul at the 
time) to Christian faith, which happened on the road to Damascus. While some politicians 
were strengthened or confirmed in their pre-travel position pro humanitarian intervention, 
others underwent a dramatic change of their political perspective (especially Nachtwei and 
Müller).  
Critics may argue that the ideological changes within the party might have taken place 
anyway, with or without the journey, or that they actually had already taken place, with the 
journey only providing a welcome excuse to justify an MP’s shift of political position in the 
middle of an electoral term (the newspaper taz, for instance, referring to Kerstin Müller’s 
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positional shift, titled at the time: ‘Is a politician allowed to do that?’). While the second 
objection cannot be totally ruled out, there are hints that the journey was indeed the catalyst 
for the fundamental change in the party’s stance on interventions. Most importantly, not even 
the shocking media representations and reports of the massacres of Srebrenica only one year 
earlier had achieved to bring a closure to the debate on the humanitarian use of military 
means. In contrast, through the ‘dramatic tying together of thought and experience’, the 
journey enabled, or set into motion, a transition within central individuals in the party that 
ultimately changed the power balance between Fundis and Realos permanently to the 
detriment of the former.  
The Green Party’s experience is without doubt an exception to the routine of German 
MPs’ field visits. The majority of these visits take place against the background of stable 
party politics, and in situations when an intervention is already in place, that is, when the 
Bundestag has already decided about the whether and how of Germany’s involvement. Only 
in very few instances is a field trip actually meant to help prepare for such a decision.22 
Nevertheless, the Green Party episode also hints at the powerful potential that the liminal 
experience of politicians’ field visits may unfold in times of political uncertainty. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
German parliamentarians’ travel activities are plenty and manifold, and this is also true for 
other intervening states and organisations.23 It may therefore seem surprising that 
policymakers’ on-site visits and the ways of knowing they entail have not been the subject of 
more studies to date, neither with regard to domestic policymaking processes nor 
international ones. This finding is not limited to intervention politics: works in interpretive 
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policy analysis, for instance, give some hints at the importance of on-site visits in a range of 
domestic policymaking processes (e.g. Hajer 2003, 293-4)24, but to my knowledge no study 
has specifically focussed on them as yet. Inspired by the works of Lisa Smirl, this article has 
tried to shed some light on the practice of German politicians’ field visits to zones of conflict 
and intervention and the effects such journeys have on the travelling MPs. 
 There are at least two lessons to be distilled from the findings and propositions of this 
article that may inspire the currently burgeoning research on knowledge production in and 
about conflict and intervention. The first one is that politicians are not just at the receiving 
end of expert knowledge on conflict/intervention at the science—expert—policy nexus 
(Leander 2014), and neither are they exclusively those actors who make use of expertise 
according to their needs (Boswell 2011; Waldman 2014). As valid as studies focussing on 
politicians as receivers, users, interpreters and/or manipulators of expert knowledge are, I 
would claim that politicians also need to be included into the analysis as producers of 
different forms of conflict/intervention knowledge. Politicians’ field trips certainly constitute 
a form of knowledge production, involving different ways of knowing ranging from the 
intellectual (e.g. briefings) to the sensory/affectual. Politicians’ experience ‘intervention’ not 
only or predominantly through the information provided to them during their journeys, but 
through the affectual effects that the personal encounters with a range of actors, places and 
objects have on them (Smirl 2015; Kraftl and Adey 2008). The more general question, 
illustratively exemplified by political field trips, of how abstract and embodied, second-hand 
and first-hand forms of knowing interact in the policymaking process is an area that certainly 
needs more attention.  
 Second, politicians’ field visits have a range of different functions and effects, , which 
go well beyond the questions of what is known and how it is known to include processes such 
as symbolical exchange, emotional bonding, and the accumulation of symbolical capital, to 
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name but a few. The functions that different ways of knowing entail need further study, too. 
While they seem to be a constitutive part of everyday practices of foreign/intervention 
politics, theories of foreign policymaking, which range from discourse analyses to studies of 
political culture and national identity to theories which focus on state bureaucracies and 
decision processes, currently do not pay any attention to affect-based ways of knowing and 
their functions in everyday politics, a small emergent body of literature on affect and 
geopolitics apart (cf. Anderson 2014, 2015; Anderson and Adey 2011; Carter and 
McCormack 2010). What a study of the sensory and affectual side of policymaking may add 
to the study of international intervention politics is a way to account for the interaction of 
socio-cognitive and precognitive everyday processes that make policymakers relate to 
‘intervention’ in certain ways and may help explain instances of policy inertia or change. A 
richer understanding of the dynamics of international interventionism may well be the 
reward. 
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Notes 
																																								 																				
1  Telephone interview, development NGO representative, Berlin, 1 September 2015.  
2 All interviews were held in June 2015, four in person in Berlin and one by telephone. Since all interviewees 
preferred to remain anonymous, I have refrained from providing any information which could help identify 
them. All quotes from German-language documents and interview transcripts have been translated by me. 
3 These would need to be added to the above figures to get a more accurate picture of German MPs’ official 
travel activities and spending, but due to access constraints it was impossible to collate this information. 
4 The majority of foreign travels are directed at other European countries including Turkey. In 2012, among the 
total of 642 parliament-financed travels of a total cost of circa €3.9 million, were the following visits to zones of 
conflict or intervention: Afghanistan (12), Bosnia and Herzegovina (3), Colombia (6), Cyprus (9), Kosovo (9), 
Lebanon (3), Liberia (2), Libya (1), Israel (11), Myanmar (11), the Palestinian territories (8), Sierra Leone (4), 
and South Sudan (5) – roughly 13 per cent of total journeys (Deutscher Bundestag 2013, 46-52). This figure has 
to be taken with a pinch of salt, however, since it is not visible from the statistics whether the topic of the 
journey was violent conflict/intervention or another political issue. Overall, the great majority of official visits 
are individual journeys by single MPs. 
5 Interview with parliamentary staff, Berlin, June 2015. 
6 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
7 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
8 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
9 The following impressions are based on several personal and telephone interviews with Bundeswehr soldiers 
who had been on missions in Afghanistan, conducted in 2011-2012.  
10 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. The question of the authenticity of experience that journeys to 
conflict zones provide is also discussed in the literature on political tourism (see Belhassen et al. 2014; Clarke 
2000). 
11 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
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12 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
13 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
14 In this sense, the major part of the literature of the ‘emotional turn’ in IR with its main focus on distinct 
emotions, while being very closely related to my argument here, does not exactly match the type of sensory 
experiences politicians seem to be going through on field visits and which may or may not crystallise in distinct 
and conscious emotions (for overviews, see e.g. Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Crawford 2000; Wolf 2012). 
Rather, my findings speak more to the emergent strand in critical geopolitics concerned with the role of affects 
in security politics (see e.g. Anderson 2014, 2015; Anderson and Adey 2011; Carter and McCormack 2010). 
15 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
16 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
17 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
18 According to an anecdote, a number of MPs from different parliamentary parties spent a nice evening on a 
famous train line and decided, as a sort of fun challenge, to refer to this joint train journey in their speeches back 
home (regardless of the topic talked about) – apparently to the annoyance of ‘uninitiated’ colleagues from their 
own parties, who lacked the insider knowledge and bonding experience of the train journey. 
19 Personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015. 
20 This part of the speech was directed at the party DIE LINKE, which is the successor party of the GDR’s 
Socialist Unity Party and the ideologically most left-leaning party currently represented in the Bundestag. Due 
to its exceptional principled objection against German military involvement, it has become the home of many 
pacifists who were formerly members of other parties, especially the Green Party (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE 
GRÜNEN) and the Social-Democrat Party (SPD). 
21 The Green Party stresses that it was also the first party in the history of the Federal Republic to organise such 
a joint journey for its party and faction boards. 
22 For example, the field trip findings/report by van Aken et al. (2011) fostered the Left Party’s objection to any 
military involvement in South Sudan, which at the time had been decreasing in favour of some sort of 
humanitarian involvement (personal interview with MP, Berlin, June 2015). 
23 This claim is so far based on anecdotal evidence; a comprehensive comparative analysis of politicians’ travels 
to zones of conflict and intervention in different western (and perhaps non-western) states is yet to be 
conducted. 
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24	Hajer gives the example of Dutch MPs whose attention to and understanding of the problem of forest dieback 
and acid rain was crucially influenced by an excursion to a dying forest. Symposia and personal meetings with 
academics and experts are seen to play a similar role in providing sensory experiences. 
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